Beyond Human by Eve Herold

Published by St. Martin's Press/Thomas Dunne Books on August 16, 2016

The title Beyond Human implies a discussion of posthuman existence, which might be defined as the next stage of human evolution, either naturally or in combination with technology that drastically enhances knowledge or intelligence while eliminating (or drastically altering) the frail and troublesome bodies that humans now inhabit. There’s almost none of that in this book.

The nature and timing of posthuman existence is purely speculative, but in between human and posthuman existence is transhuman existence. Transhumanism generally refers to the nanobiotechnological enhancement of human beings. That ground is partially covered, in cursory fashion, in Beyond Human. Eve Herold’s book should not be confused with other books of the same name (a couple for sale on Amazon seem to have religious or self-help themes), including science fiction author Gregory Benford’s, which is subtitled “Living with Robots and Cyborgs.” Herold’s book is subtitled “How Cutting-Edge Science is Extending Our Lives,” which has precious little to do with the main title.

Herold begins a number of her sentences with phrases like “It may seem like science fiction, but ….” In fact, science fiction fans will be familiar with the more futuristic life-extension and life-enhancement techniques that Herold discusses. Using nanobots to cure disease, augmenting vision with biotechnology, improving memory by wirelessly connecting the brain to the internet, avoiding accidental death with the help of self-driving cars and robotic servants -- it’s all a given to science fiction fans. And while these technologies aren’t all just around the corner, they’re coming. That makes it imperative to think about the practical and ethical problems that the technologies might create, because it’s better to avoid a problem than to contain it after it begins to spread. Unfortunately, Herold’s book doesn’t demonstrate much original thought in those areas.

The first few chapters deal with hearts and other organs. Transplants are nothing new, although Herold finds promise in rapamycin, a drug made from a fungus found on Easter Island that has proven useful in deterring tissue rejection and may soon be used to slow aging and extend lifespans. Herold also talks about artificial organs (again focusing more on current rather than future technologies) and on the medical uses of nanotechnology. The latter is truly a future technology, and one that sf writers have explored in greater depth than Herold manages.

Later chapters discuss anti-aging drugs and gene manipulation and stem cell treatments. Herold again mentions the potential of nanomedicine without providing enough detail to grasp its implications. Herold does recognize that granting immortality to old people (like me) will crowd the planet with seniors yelling “get off my lawn” while limiting the ability of young people to innovate -- a sure recipe for stagnation, followed by disaster.

More interesting are Herold’s summaries of ethical issues surrounding artificial life extension. Some of those issues exist now (when is it ethical to turn off a pacemaker or an implanted defibrillator in a dying patient?) and others will eventually arise. If a failing heart is only beating because hundreds of nanobots have been programmed to emulate heart functions such as oxygenating blood, is it ethical to turn off the nanobots if they are extending the suffering life of a critically ill patient?

Herold also explores brain enhancement, including potential cures for Alzheimer’s and various devices that might improve cognitive ability through brain stimulation. We’re told that “very little is known” about memory-enhancing brain implants so their impact on society can’t be predicted, which seems to defeat the purpose of a book that is predicting the future of life extension and enhancement. Herold nevertheless addresses the future of brain-computer interfaces. She recognizes the Borg problem (talk to a Trekkie if you don’t know what means) that could result from the creation of an artificially intelligent hive-mind, and nods to Ray Kurzweil’s prediction of the Singularity. Readers who really want to understand the risks and benefits of a future in which artificial intelligences develop themselves into a superintelligence should probably read Kurzweil, Vernor Vinge, or other writers who do the concept justice. Herold’s discussion is too superficial to be a useful introduction.

When Herold engages in philosophical discussions of artificial life extension or enhancement, she sometimes draws upon Our Posthuman Future by Francis Fukuyama, which sounds like a deeper and more useful book than Beyond Human. Many interesting questions are posed -- Should we prolong life if we are just prolonging suffering? Shouldn’t aging people just get out of the way of generations that are more capable of producing and reproducing? Does technology replace humanity in transhuman life? -- but Herold’s answers are again superficial. I suspect Fukuyama addressed those questions more meaningfully. I had the same reaction to the provocative material she drew from James Hughes’ Citizen Cyborg.

Herold seems rather dismissive of the concerns addressed by “bioconservatives” but offers little evidence to support her more Pollyannaish take on the future (although she does acknowledge that the gray goo problem is worrisome). The final chapter tells us to embrace transhumanism (at least in the medical field) and to reject the “blind prejudice” of fuddy-duddies like Fukuyama. Get rid of that stinkin’ thinkin’, she seems to say, and everything will be fine. (In that regard, Herold’s tone is similar to that of nonscientists who tell us not to worry about climate change.) I’m not a conservative, bio or otherwise, but I didn’t find Herold’s unsupported optimism to be all that persuasive.

A chapter on social robots is sort of funny, and her discussion of the potential usefulness of robots (particularly as doctors, cars, and soldiers) is straightforward but not particularly illuminating. I did enjoy the discussion of whether robots should have rights, although I have enjoyed pondering that question in decades of sf novels, beginning with my first exposure to Isaac Asimov. I also appreciated the thought that robots should be required to carry insurance. Tons of insurance, since moviegoers all know that robots will eventually run amok and kill lots of people.

Readers who want a very simple overview of how technology can extend and enhance life will find it here. Science fiction readers will have been exposed to more stimulating discussions of the transhuman future and the ethical issues that accompany it. If the book had included more original thinking, it might have been an engrossing read. As it stands, I would recommend it only as a very basic overview for readers who have had little exposure to the subject matter. And even those readers might be better served by reading works of science fiction by Charles Stross, Vernor Vinge, Greg Egan, and dozens of other authors who illuminate the issue more brightly than Herold managed.

NOT RECOMMENDED

The Clothing of Books by Jhumpa Lahiri

This is the last of five "Vintage Shorts" that Tzer Island received for review. Other essays in the series were reviewed this week (on Tuesday) and last week (on Tuesday) and two weeks ago (on Tuesday and Thursday).

Published by Vintage on November 15, 2016

Jhumpa Lahiri begins this essay (originally delivered as a lecture) by describing school uniforms as providing students with both an identity and anonymity. She envied her uniformed cousins in Calcutta because, as an Indian student in America, she did not share a group identity and could not blend in with her surroundings. Asserting individuality with clothing was a vexing problem. Clothing therefore carries a special meaning for her, even into adulthood, and it is the clothing of her books, more commonly known as dust jackets or paperback covers, that is the subject of her essay.

“If the process of writing is a dream, the book cover represents the awakening.” The jacket is a marketing tool. Lahiri frets that the jacket reflects how its designers see the book (which is rarely the way Lahiri sees it), although I suspect the reality is that most art departments don’t read the book before designing the jacket. Lahiri has a particularly visceral reaction to jackets and covers, because just as “the right cover is like a beautiful coat, elegant and warm, wrapping my words as they travel through the world,” the wrong one is “cumbersome, suffocating.” Given that she was born in America and lives in Italy, Lahiri particularly disfavors stereotyped covers that depict elephants and scenes from India. That’s understandable.

The most interesting aspect of the essay is the observation that covers may create false expectations (particularly if a gullible reader believes the blurbs). A naked book conveys no expectations at all and may therefore allow the reader to approach the content with a more open mind. Lahiri hates blurbs for the simple reason that she wants readers to read her own words, not the words of a blurb writer or an editor who wrote the synopsis on the inside flaps of the dust jacket. I can’t blame her for that, particularly when the synopsis and blurbs are so often disconnected from the content of the book.

The Clothing of Books is a well-written essay but not a particularly enlightening one. It’s fairly well known that authors usually have little control over covers and dust jackets and often dislike the choices made by their publishers. Lahiri recognizes that the purpose of a cover is to sell books, not to please the author (although a cover that successfully sells books should please the author for reasons that are financial, if not aesthetic). Still, the essay seems a bit too self-absorbed and self-satisfied as Lahiri laments the inability of book covers to reflect what is truly special about her words.

I am, however, taken with Lahiri’s observation that European publishing houses are more likely to use similar covers on books by different authors, giving those books a sense of being part of the same family, while American book covers (unless reprinting a series of classics) reflect the diversity and individuality that characterize the country (school uniforms not being favored by American students).

Devoted readers will read pretty much anything that is related to the process of writing, however tangentially. To those readers (and I count myself among them), I give this essay a guarded recommendation.

RECOMMENDED WITH RESERVATIONS

To Be Black in America Is to Walk with Fury by Nathan McCall

Published digitally by Vintage as a "Vintage Short" on February 23, 2016

Nathan McCall’s essay on “America’s contempt and utter disregard for black life” is timely, given the recent election's reminder that white supremacy is still advocated by a good many of the Angry White Men who are hostile to racial harmony and equal rights for all. Reflections on racism will always be timely as long as racism exists, but the Black Lives Matter movement and the bitter climate of Trump's election make McCall’s observations resonate.

Twenty years ago, McCall wrote Makes Me Wanna Holler, describing his transition from prison inmate to journalist. A part of the essay updates readers of Makes Me Wanna Holler about how McCall’s life turned out. I suspect that part will be of greater value to those who read his book than those who did not. I’m in the latter group.

McCall maintains that little has changed in the intervening decades, in that many white Americans continue to believe that the United States belongs to white people and “are willfully blinded to the depth and breadth of its racial pathology.” Those are the whites who are “America’s greatest racial tormenters and, at the same time, the most tortured victims of their own propaganda.” There is certainly truth in those statements, even if they are a bit too sweeping.

Of course, America has changed, as the election of a black president reflects, a monumental event that McCall does not acknowledge in the first two-thirds of his essay. When he does, he says, “Even when a black man reaches the very pinnacle of power, he’s still considered a nigger.” By some, yes, but if that were universally true, Obama would never have been elected and reelected. I understand McCall’s howl of pain, but I don’t think it excuses blanket statements that distort reality.

I also don’t buy McCall’s subtext. Part of McCall’s anger comes from his struggle to overcome a past that includes felony convictions for crimes he readily admits he committed. The subtext is that racism caused him to commit those crimes. Well, maybe, but an awful lot of black people manage to confront or cope with racism without committing robberies and assaults.

There is nevertheless much of value in this essay, thoughts that merit attention, even if McCall’s observations aren’t new or novel. McCall touches upon the myth of American meritocracy, crime as a leveling force that provides a route to economic equality, the enduring stain of racism even among educated whites, the disconnect between white and black perceptions of racial realities, the failure of history classes to convey the horror of black oppression, and the disproportionate imprisonment of black men to feed a prison system that gives disproportionate employment to white workers. He also discusses lessons he learned in South Africa that apply to racial experience in America. All of those issues, which a brief essay can only touch upon, are compelling, making the essay as a whole a worthwhile read.

RECOMMENDED

Can't We All Disagree More Constructively? by Jonathan Haidt

Tzer Island does not usually review essays, nor does it usually publish reviews on Tuesdays. Having accepted the opporunity to read some essays published in the Vintage Short series, however, I've been reviewing them. Two essays were reviewed last week on Tuesday and Thursay. Thursday this week is Thanksgiving and Tzer Island is taking the day off. Two more essay reviews will appear next week. Vintage Shorts are available in digital format for about a buck.

Published by Vintage on October 4, 2016. The essay is taken from The Righteous Mind, published by Vintage on March 13, 2012

The title of Jonathan Haidt's essay answers itself. If obstructionists from all political stripes worked toward constructive solutions of common problems rather than refusing to betray their ideological purity (or, more cynically, refusing to cede political power by working together with people they view as political enemies), a good many of the nation’s ills would be cured. But how can that happen?

Increasing polarization in the electorate, says Haidt, is nothing compared to polarization in Washington. Beginning in 1990, traditions of friendship between Republicans and Democrats in Congress were discouraged by party leaders, weakening human connections and making it easy for party members to treat opposing party members as political enemies. Since the ability of Congress to solve problems depends on its operation as a collegial body, the “take no prisoners” mentality weakens Congress as an institution.

What is the source of “hyperpartisanship”? Haidt suggests that social class and self-interest are no longer strong predictors of ideology (i.e., the wealthy are not always conservative and the poor are not always liberal). He reviews research suggesting that there is a genetic basis for political ideology (conservatives are genetically predisposed to fear and respect for authority; liberals are genetically inclined to empathy and to new experiences).

So far, so good. Where Haidt goes off track, I think, is his failure to recognize that many of the arguments he makes against liberalism apply equally, or more strongly, to conservatism. He contends that the failure of progressives to consider how their proposed changes to society would weaken “moral capital” is “the fundamental blind spot of the left.” His suggestion that conservatives have more moral capital (resources that sustain a moral community) than liberals is unsupportable. Contrary to Haidt's suggestion, I suspect that most liberals do consider how their proposed changes will affect society, and that they don’t find many conservative “moral” causes (condemnation of gays, suppression of minority voting rights, imprisoning suspected terrorists without due process and then torturing them, advancing economic policies that concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, hostility toward government regulations that benefit workers and the environment, etc.) to be particularly moral. The notion that “conformity and loyalty” strengthen moral capital is true only if people are expected to conform and be loyal to moral behavior, which doesn’t include bashing anyone who isn’t a white Christian conservative straight male (or a submissive white Christian conservative female).

To be fair, Haidt suggests that conservatives, while allegedly doing a better job than liberals of preserving moral capital, “often fail to notice certain classes of victims, fail to limit the predations of certain powerful interests, and fail to see the need to change or update institutions as times change.” Yet those very failures are evidence that conservatives are preserving their own narrow self-interests, not moral capital.

Haidt suggests that liberals want too much change too quickly and thus squander moral capital. Maybe, but it seems more likely that diligent efforts to combat racism, sexism, religious intolerance, and political corruption actually build the moral capital that is needed to make enduring changes that benefit all Americans, not just the social conservatives. Yes, that pisses off the conservatives and encourages them to rally around their causes, but quietly enduring oppression changes nothing.

Haidt then talks about his agreement with certain fundamental tenets of liberalism (government restraint of corporate abuses and regulatory efforts that improve the quality of life), libertarianism (free markets work wonders), and conservatism (helping minorities hurts majorities). I’m paraphrasing the last one, but I think that’s what Haidt is really saying. He argues that enforced diversity weakens social bonds that make a society strong, but America’s diversity has always been its strength — not to mention that equality of rights is a fundamental American moral value. I don’t buy the premise that helping a “subset of bees” is likely to “damage the hive.”

I don't mean to suggest that all conservatives are small-minded social conservatives, but those are the voices that control politicians on the right side of the aisle. Conservative legislators must do their bidding, at least to some extent, if they want to be reelected. Karl Rove thought he had a master plan when he created a big tent to house social conservatives together with economic conservatives, but the social conservatives won't share the tent with conservatives who reject their narrow-minded view of the world. If the Rockefeller Republicans once again have a meaningful role in the party, compromise might replace hyperpartisanship, but that won't happen any time soon.

Near the end of the essay, Haidt gets around to the topic suggested by the title, but doesn’t offer much hope for constructive disagreement. If members of Congress lived in Washington instead of flying home every weekend, their kids might become friends and they might not view political opponents as enemies, but who’s going to make that happen? He urges people to open their hearts as a means to open their minds, but people who urge society’s return to the pre-Civil War era aren’t about to open their hearts to immigrants and blacks and gays and all the other people they evidently despise. Haidt’s essay is interesting, but I don’t see much in it that I would regard as constructive.

NOT RECOMMENDED

The Paranoid Style in American Politics: An Essay by Richard Hofstadter

Tzer Island does not usually review essays, nor does it usually publish reviews on Thursdays. Having accepted the opporunity to read some essays published in the Vintage Short series, however, I've decided to review them this week and next on Tuesday and Thursay. Vintage Shorts are available in digital format for about a buck.

Published by Vintage on October 4, 2016

Richard Hofstadter’s essay was first delivered as a lecture in 1963. The lecture was revised and expanded into this 1965 essay. Hofstadter’s analysis is even more salient today.

Hofstadter uses “paranoid style” as a shorthand for “the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy.” He wrote those words long before “birthers” ignored the president’s birth certificate to claim he wasn’t an American, long before suggestions were made that Hillary Clinton conspired to murder Vince Foster, and long before wild claims surfaced that leftists assassinated Justice Scalia.

The paranoid style characterizes people who persist in believing, on the basis of no evidence, that a conspiracy is afoot to attack “a nation, a culture, a way of life.” They posture themselves as true patriots who justly respond to the conspirators with righteousness and moral indignation. Hofstadter uses the word “style” to emphasize that he is talking about the way ideas are advocated rather than the truth or falsity of their content, although he acknowledges that the paranoid style “has a better affinity for bad causes than good.”

Hofstadter traces examples of the paranoid style from the nation’s inception to the early 1960s. He gives special attention to conspiracy claims advanced against Masons and Catholics in earlier centuries before turning his attention to “the contemporary right wing” (remembering, again that “contemporary” means 1950s and early 1960s). As opposed to the earlier right wing, which felt it was defending values that were still common in America (such as racial supremacy), Hofstadter notes that the new right wing feels “dispossessed.” Their values were no longer at the core of American life, having been maliciously eroded (they believe) by intellectuals and urban dwellers. They see themselves as fighting a losing battle against foreign influences, define those who disagree with them as Communists, and see conspiracies everywhere. Indeed, anyone who disagrees with their paranoid view of America is by definition a traitor. Sounds familiar, doesn’t it? The enemy today is not so much Communism as the perceived threat of a “world government” that would oust the United States from its entitled position of leadership, but not much else needs to be changed to update Hofstadter’s analysis.

According to Hofstadter, a vast and sinister conspiracy to destroy the American way of life is at the heart of the paranoid style. Conspiracies are viewed in apocalyptic terms, as struggles of ultimate good versus ultimate evil. Alleged conspirators are attacked for their lack of morality (particularly as expressed by their sexual freedom and desires). The threat posed by conspirators can only be overcome by militant action that eliminates the threat and leads to unqualified victory (hence, the preference for tough talking, saber-rattling leaders and the lack of tolerance for any viewpoint with which they disagree). Anything less leaves them frustrated, which is why they are doomed always to feel frustrated, regardless of election outcomes. Opposing viewpoints are difficult to eradicate, they feel, because the enemy controls the media, has unlimited resources, and has taken over the educational system. They strive mightily to find evidence to support their paranoid thoughts and are prepared to believe anything that purports to stand as proof, no matter how unverified or fanciful, since only the unbelievable is worthy of belief. Or, if they meticulously gather facts, the facts have nothing to do with the judgments they make. Again, this sounds awfully familiar.

Hofstadter suggests that the paranoid style surfaces most prominently in times of ethnic or religious conflict. That observation is apt. Immigrants and Muslims have served to trigger paranoid thinking in current society. What Hofstadter wrote half a century ago is just as germane today, as witnessed by the election of Donald Trump, who fanned the flames of racial and religious hatred that feeds the paranoid style. Since they believe the enemy must be wiped out, people who adopt the paranoid style have no interest in electing leaders who will negotiate political solutions to the real problems that weaken the nation. The paranoid are not subject to reason, because they will not surrender their fantasies. Sadly, they think their wrong-headed votes will change things, when in fact nothing can relieve them of their paranoid delusions. Of course, if they elect enough candidates who share their paranoia, they might get what they want -- the utter destruction of those who disagree with them -- but at a considerable cost to the nation.

Of course, those who have adopted the paranoid style will dismiss Hofstadter's essay as enemy propaganda. For everyone else, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, this essay is essential to understand why progress in America is so often blocked by people who would rather shout (or shoot) than try to find common ground.

RECOMMENDED

Update (Nov 26, 2016): The essay is all the more timely in light of persuasive reports that conspiracy theorists were manipulated by fake news reports that caused them to believe untrue accusations against Hillary Clinton. Ironic, isn't it, that the Russian governmetn was largely responsible for those stories, thus allying themselves with right-wing voters who would, if not so gullible, be suspicious of "news" that originates from a government committed to undermining American democracy.